On stochastic auctions in risk-averse electricity markets with uncertain
  supply by Cory-Wright, Ryan & Zakeri, Golbon
ar
X
iv
:1
80
4.
08
81
5v
3 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  2
5 J
un
 20
19
On Stochastic Auctions in Risk-Averse Electricity Markets With Uncertain Supply
Ryan Cory-Wrighta,∗, Golbon Zakerib,1
aOperations Research Center, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, MA, USA
bDepartment of Engineering Science and The Energy Centre, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand
Abstract
This paper studies risk in a stochastic auction which facilitates the integration of renewable generation in electricity markets. We
model market participants who are risk averse and reflect their risk aversion through coherent risk measures. We uncover a closed
form characterization of a risk-averse generator’s optimal pre-commitment behaviour for a given real-time policy, both with and
without risk trading.
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1. Introduction
Renewable power generation is an increasingly attractive in-
vestment option for participants in electricity pool markets, as
it does not emit carbon and has a marginal cost of zero. Fur-
thermore, investment in intermittent renewable generation is
attractive from a regulatory standpoint, as wind and solar gen-
erators reduce the expected dispatch cost and do not emit car-
bon. However, renewable investment increases supply-side un-
certainty. This creates difficulties for independent system oper-
ators (ISOs) when clearing electricity pool markets, as inflex-
ible coal and nuclear generators may require several hours or
more to implement a dispatch and intermittent power output is
unknown this far in advance.
When intermittent renewable generators supply a small pro-
portion of electricity, the ISO can efficiently manage deviations
from forecasts by procuring suitable amounts of frequency-
keeping and reserve generation. However, when intermittent
generators supply a larger proportion of electricity, procuring
suitable amounts of reserve generation becomes expensive and
more efficient grid management strategies are required. Conse-
quently, some market operators employ a two-market strategy,
which involves:
1. Clearing a pre-commitment market by assuming that re-
newable generation takes its forecast value.
2. Letting nature select a realization of uncertainty.
3. Clearing a real-time market, to balance deviations between
renewables’ forecast and realised generation output.
This two-market structure allows inflexible generators to imple-
ment a dispatch, by providing them with a pre-commitment set-
point. However, the pre-commitment and real-time nodal prices
might not converge in expectation, as the expected adjustment
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cost is not priced when computing the pre-commitment set-
point. As noted in [22], this price distortion is a market design
flaw which may lead to systematic arbitrage opportunities.
More sophisticated uncertainty management strategies com-
prise modelling intermittent renewable generation as a random
variable and computing a pre-commitment setpoint accord-
ing to the optimal solution of a two-stage stochastic program,
which minimizes the expected cost of generation plus adjust-
ment. After uncertainty is realised, a real-time market is subse-
quently cleared by minimizing the cost of generating electricity
plus adjusting to manage fluctuations from forecast renewable
generation output. This market-clearing strategy is known as
stochastic dispatch, and has been studied by authors including
[5, 14, 21, 7]. Stochastic dispatch almost-surely induces ef-
ficiency savings in the long-run [see 4], because it explicitly
prices the expected cost of deviating from a pre-commitment
setpoint in the first stage.
In spite of the almost-sure existence of cumulative system
savings, we cannot guarantee that all market participants ben-
efit from stochastic dispatch. Indeed, implementing stochastic
dispatch could leave generators out of pocket, and cost recov-
ery is only guaranteed in expectation. This raises the question:
What happens if market participants are risk averse?
This question is also of interest in a different context. One
main criticism of stochastic dispatch, is that the system as a
whole must have a unified view of the future distribution of out-
comes, e.g. all agents must agree with the distribution of wind
in the next hour. Allowing for risk aversion offers some flexibil-
ity here. Perceiving a different distribution of future outcomes
by an agent, can often be equivalently modelled as that agent
being risk averse, and equipped with a coherent risk measure.
This perspective is often taken in finance, where a martingale
measure emerges through a complete market and agents risks
are traded [3]. We are interested in investigating the outcomes
of such markets and we will return to this point in Section 3.
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1.1. Contributions and Structure
The main contributions of this paper are (a) a characteriza-
tion of the impact of pre-commitment on real-time nodal prices,
and its interplay with contracts and (b) a characterization of the
impact of risk-aversion on pre-commitment.
The structure of the paper is as follows:
• In Section 2, we briefly outline stochastic dispatch.
• In Section 3, we study stochastic dispatch in a risk-averse
context. When generators are endowed with coherent risk
measures and cannot trade risk, the resultant risk-averse
competitive equilibrium admits a solution, whenever nodal
prices are capped. We obtain a closed-form relationship
between each generator’s pre-commitment and their real-
time dispatch, and demonstrate this can results in pre-
commitment supply shortfalls. Alternatively, inclusion of
Arrow-Debreu securities leads to a second risked equilib-
rium, which itself yields excess pre-commitment.
2. Background
We start this section by reviewing the stochastic dispatch
mechanism (SDM) presented in [21]. SDM is a mechanism
that explicitly models wind supply uncertainty using a proba-
bility distribution, and tailors a pre-commitment setpoint to this
distribution. Optimal recourse actions are chosen after renew-
able generation output is revealed.
Notation
We use lowercase Roman symbols such as x to denote de-
terministic variables, uppercase Roman symbols such as X(ω)
to denote random variables and lowercase Greek symbols such
as λn(ω) to denote prices. We use an assortment of sets and in-
dices. We let ω ∈ Ω represent a scenario in our sample spaceΩ,
which we assume to be finite. We let F be a closed, convex and
non-empty set of flows which obey thermal limits, line capac-
ities and the DC load-flow constraints imposed by Kirchhoff’s
laws. Finally, we let i be the index of a generation unit, N be
the set of all nodes in the network, and T (n) be the set of all
generators located at node n ∈ N .
We also use an assortment of problem data. We let ci be gen-
erator i’s marginal generation cost, which we take to be truth-
fully stated. We let Dn(ω) be the inelastic demand at node n in
scenario ω, and Gi(ω) be generator i’s production capacity in
scenario ω. Finally, we let ru,i (respectively rv,i) be generator
i’s marginal cost of upward (downward) deviation. We require
that ru,i, rv,i > 0 for some generator i, as otherwise all gener-
ation units are infinitely flexible and can be dispatched after
uncertainty is realised.
2.1. The Stochastic Dispatch Mechanism (SDM)
In SDM, we model renewable generation output by a set of
samples from a continuous distribution, which constitutes an
ensemble forecast of future uncertainty. Consequently, SDM
is a Sample Average Approximation which yields a sequence
of pre-commitment setpoints that asymptotically converge to
the optimal setpoint as the number of scenarios considered
increases [see 18]. We determine SDM’s pre-commitment
setpoint, x∗, and the corresponding real-time dispatch policy
X⋆(ω), by solving the following stochastic program:
SLP: min E[c⊤X(ω) + r⊤u U(ω) + r
⊤
v V(ω)]
s.t.
∑
i∈T (n)
Xi(ω) + τn(F(ω)) ≥ Dn(ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀n ∈ N ,
x + U(ω) − V(ω) = X(ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω,
F(ω) ∈ F , ∀ω ∈ Ω,
0 ≤ X(ω) ≤ G(ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω,
U(ω), V(ω), x ≥ 0, ∀ω ∈ Ω,
where xi is generator i’s pre-commitment setpoint, the amount
generator i prepares to produce before uncertainty is realised,
Xi(ω) is generator i’s real-time dispatch in scenario ω, Ui(ω)
(respectively Vi(ω)) is generator i’s upward (downward) devia-
tion from its setpoint in scenarioω, F(ω) is the vector of branch
flows through the network in scenarioω, and τn(F(ω)) is the net
energy injected from the grid into node n in scenario ω.
After determining the pre-commitment setpoint x∗, nature se-
lects the scenario ωˆ, and the ISO solves the following recourse
problem for the real-time dispatch X(ωˆ):
min c⊤X(ωˆ) + r⊤u U(ωˆ) + r
⊤
v V(ωˆ)
s.t.
∑
i∈T (n)
Xi(ωˆ) + τn(F(ωˆ)) ≥ Dn(ωˆ), ∀n ∈ N , [λn(ωˆ)],
X(ωˆ) − U(ωˆ) + V(ωˆ) = x⋆, [ρ(ωˆ)],
F(ωˆ) ∈ F ,
0 ≤ X(ωˆ) ≤ G(ωˆ),
U(ωˆ),V(ωˆ) ≥ 0,
where λn(ωˆ) is the dual multiplier for the supply-demand bal-
ance constraint at node n in scenario ωˆ, and ρ(ωˆ) is the nonan-
ticipavity dual multiplier in scenario ωˆ. Note that solving the
recourse problem (rather than inspecting SLP’s recourse pol-
icy), is necessary because the first-stage problem considers a
Sample-Average-Approximation of uncertainty, and the sce-
nario selected by nature is almost-surely not contained in SLP’s
ensemble forecast.
After solving both stages, the ISO pays λ j(i)(ωˆ)Xi(ωˆ) to gen-
erator i and charges λn(ωˆ)Dn(ωˆ) to consumer n, where j(i) is
the index of the node where generator i is located (but does not
compensate each generator’s first-stage decision [see 21, for a
justification] ). The ISO does not incur a penalty for deviat-
ing from f to F(ωˆ), and therefore is never out of pocket [21,
Proposition 1]. Moreover, generators recover their fuel and de-
viation costs in expectation (but not with probability 1), as both
quantities are priced when clearing the first stage [see 7].
2.2. On Pre-Commitment and Real-Time Nodal Prices
We now recall some results from convex analysis which we
will invoke repeatedly in this paper:
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Proposition 1. Let x, xˆ ≥ 0 be two feasible pre-commitment
setpoints, with corresponding optimal recourse dispatches
X(ω), Xˆ(ω). Then, the optimal second-stage nonanticipavity
dual multipliers, ρ(ω), ρˆ(ω) obey the following relationship:
P
(
〈x − xˆ, ρ(ω) − ρˆ(ω)〉 ≥ 0
)
= 1.
Proof. This follows directly from the observation that the sub-
gradient of the first-stage dispatch problem with respect to x in
scenarioω, ρ(ω), is a maximal monotone operator [see 16].
Corollary 2. Let generator i’s dispatch under SDM in scenario
ω be 0 < Xi(ω) < Gi. Then, for sufficiently small changes δ in
xi (such that the same inequality constraints remain binding in
the real-time problem), we have that
• if xi,new = xi + δ > xi then either ∆λ j(i),new(ω) = 0 or
∆λ j(i),new(ω) = ru,i + rv,i, and,
• if xi,new = xi + δ < xi then either ∆λ j(i),new(ω) = 0 or
∆λ j(i),new(ω) = −ru,i − rv,i.
Proof. Observe that if 0 < Xi(ω) < Gi then the real-time dis-
patch problem’s KKT condition with respect to Xi(ω) is:
λ j(i)(ω) + ρi(ω) = ci,
meaning we have that ∆λ j(i)(ω) + ∆ρi(ω) = 0.
Moreover, the KKT conditions with respect to Ui(ω), Vi(ω)
imply that −ru,i ≤ ρi(ω) ≤ rv,i. Therefore, there exists some
optimal basis where ρi(ω) = rv,i or ρi(ω) = −ru,i for each gen-
erator i, without loss of generality. Invoking Proposition 1 then
yields the result, where we use the continuity of the optimal
primal solution in the problem data [see 12] to ensure that the
same primal constraints remain binding.
Remark 3. The real-time nodal price λ is a maximal monotone
operator with respect to the realised net demand D. There-
fore, for two given real-time demand vectors D, Dˆ the real-time
prices obey the relationship
〈
Dˆ − D, λˆ − λ
〉
≥ 0, and, since gen-
erator supply margins are nondecreasing functions of the real-
time price, deterministic generators prefer low wind (higher net
demand) periods. That is, if generators are risk-averse then
their risk-aversion causes them to place additional emphasis
on high-wind periods.
3. Two Risk-Averse Stochastic Auctions
In this section we study the outcome of agent interactions
when agents are risk averse with no opportunity to trade risk,
and uncover the inefficiencies that transpire as a result. We then
move on to completing the risk trade market, and demonstrate
that much like in finance [3], when coherent risk measures are
used and in presence of a complete market, a martingale mea-
sure emerges, leading to an equivalent social planning model
that embeds participants’ risks, and efficiency is restored.
We restrict our attention to law-invariant coherent risk mea-
sures because of their natural dual representability [see 10]. Our
analysis resembles the analysis of risk-trading conducted by
[15] although we restrict our attention to energy-only markets.
This restriction allows us to exploit the properties of risk-averse
newsvendors established by Choi et al. [6].
Definition 4. A coherent risk measure, ρ : Z 7→ R, as defined
in [1], is a function which measures the risk-adjusted disbenefit
of a random variable Z.
In this paper, we will work with the dual representation of a
coherent risk measure, i.e. there exists a convex set of measures
D where ρ can be defined by:
ρ(Z) = max
µ∈D
Eµ[Z].
By Kusuoka’s Theorem [see 10] each coherent risk measure
can be represented in the following mean-risk form for some
risk coefficient κ and some risk setD:
ρ(Z) = −E[Z] + κ sup
µ∈D
∫ β=1
β=0
1
β
qβ[Z]µdβ
= −κ sup
µ∈D
∫ β=1
β=0
CVaRβ[Z]µdβ,
where
qβ[Z] = min
η∈R
E[max((1 − β)(η − Z), β(Z − η))]
is the weighted mean-deviation from the βth quantile, κ is a
constant which prices risk by balancing the desirability of max-
imizing E[Z] with the undesirability of fluctuations towards the
left tail of Z, andD is a convex subset of probability measures.
As observed by Philpott et al. [13], whenever the sample
space Ω is finite, at least one of the worst-case probability mea-
sures inD is an extreme point ofD. Consequently, in a Sample
Average Approximation (SAA) setting, ρ(Z) is equal to the op-
timal value of the following linear program:
ρ(Z) = min θ s.t. θ ≥
∑
ω
Pm(ω)Z(ω), ∀m,
where Pm is the measure which corresponds to the mth extreme
point ofD. Moreover, ifD is polyhedral then the cardinality of
m is finite and the above problem can be solved in a tractable
fashion via linear programming, and otherwise it can be solved
via a cutting-plane method, such as a Bundle Method [see 11].
3.1. Risk-Averse SDM Without Risk Trading
SDM is equivalent to a system where risk neutral price-
taking participants optimize their return against the so called
Walrasian auctioneer’s announced prices [see 21]. Below, we
investigate a risk-averse equilibrium, wherein each generation
agent i is endowed with a coherent risk measure ρi, with a view
to show that the risk-averse equilibrium always admits at least
one solution. Observe that since the ISO and the market clear-
ing agent do not have first-stage actions, they perform the same
action under any coherent risk measure. Therefore, we treat
both agents as risk-neutral without loss of generality. We now
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state the ISO’s problem (PISO) and the market clearing prob-
lem (MC) below:
PISO(ω) : max
∑
n
λn(ω)τn(F(ω)) s.t. F(ω) ∈ F ,
MC(ω) : max−
∑
n
λn(ω)
( ∑
i∈T (n)
Xi(ω) + τn(F(ω)) − Dn(ω)
)
s.t. λn(ω) ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ N ,
Notably, however, each generation agent i makes a pre-
commitment decision xi in the first-stage, which may be af-
fected by risk-aversion. Therefore, we reflect each generation
agent i’s attitude towards risk via the risk measure ρi(·). Given
this risk measure and prices λi(ω) in each scenario ω, each gen-
eration agent i maximizes its risk-adjusted expected profit by
determining the actions (x, X(ω),U(ω),V(ω)) which solve the
following stochastic optimization problem:
RAP(i) : max ρi
(
(λ j(i)(ω) − ci)Xi(ω) − ru,iUi(ω) − rv,iVi(ω)
)
s.t. xi + Ui(ω) − Vi(ω) = Xi(ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω,
0 ≤ Xi(ω) ≤ Gi(ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω,
Ui(ω),Vi(ω), xi ≥ 0, ∀ω ∈ Ω.
Observe that generation agent i almost-surely recovers its
risk-adjusted costs in the long-run, since it can choose the ac-
tion (x, X,U,V) = (0, 0, 0, 0) and earn a certain payoff of 0.
The collection of the problems PISO(ω), RAP(i) and MC(ω)
then defines a risk-averse competitive equilibrium, which we
refer to as RAEQ. Our subsequent analysis assumes that RAEQ
admits a solution, and therefore requires an existence result. To
obtain this result, we require the following intermediate lemma:
Lemma 5. Let generation agent i be a risk-averse price-taking
generation agent endowed with the coherent risk measure ρi.
Then agent i’s optimization problem, RAP(i), has a closed, con-
vex and bounded strategy set.
Proof. The constraint 0 ≤ Xi(ω) ≤ Gi(ω) implies genera-
tor i’s optimal action, x⋆
i
, satisfies the inequality 0 ≤ x⋆
i
≤
maxω{Gi(ω)}, as otherwise it can decrease its setpoint from xi
to Gi and almost-surely earn an additional profit of (xi −Gi)rv,i,
which implies that if xi > Gi is an optimal setpoint then Gi is
also an optimal setpoint. Therefore, we can introduce the con-
straint 0 ≤ x⋆
i
≤ maxω{Gi(ω)} into the problem RAP(i), with-
out loss of optimality. The restrictions on X and x then imply
that 0 ≤ Ui(ω),Vi(ω) ≤ Gi(ω), sinceUi(ω) = max(Xi(ω)−xi, 0)
and Vi(ω) = max(xi − Xi(ω), 0). Therefore, the strategy space
RAP(i) is bounded.
The strategy space is also closed and convex, because it is
defined by the intersection of linear inequality constraints.
We also require the following assumption:
Assumption 6. The optimal choice of dual price λn(ω) is
bounded from above by the Value of Lost Load, or VOLL, for
all nodes n and all scenarios ω.
Assumption 6 is common in power system applications; for
instance, the New Zealand Electricity Market has a price cap
of VOLL=$20, 000 per MWh, meaning consumers are willing
to curtail their load at a marginal price of $20, 000 per MWh
in the short-run (see [19] for a general theory). Moreover, [21,
Lemma 1] establishes that for a fixed pre-commitment setpoint
x and set of real-time demand realisations, there exists some
price cap such that Assumption 6 holds everywhere except a set
of measure 0.
Combining Lemma 5 and Assumption 6 then yields:
Theorem 7. Suppose that Assumption 6 holds. Then, RAEQ
admits a solution.
Proof. To show this result, we follow the steps of Rosen’s theo-
rem [see 17] in arguing that the following three conditions hold:
1. Each participant’s strategy set is non-empty.
2. Each participant’s strategy set is closed, convex and
bounded.
3. Each participant’s payoff function is concave in her strat-
egy, and continuous in all other participants’ strategies.
The first statement holds, as each participant can choose the
feasible action of setting all their decision variables to 0, and
therefore all participants have non-empty strategy sets.
To show that the second statement holds, we consider each
class of agent separately. First, the problem PISO(ω)’s strat-
egy space is the closed, convex and bounded set F , which im-
plies that the second statement holds for PISO(ω). Second, by
Lemma 5, each generation agent i’s strategy set is closed, con-
vex and bounded. Finally, by Assumption 6, the market clear-
ing agent’s strategy space is a bounded set which can be seen
to be closed and convex by inspection. Therefore, the second
statement holds for all participants in RAEQ.
The third statement holds for all generation agents, as their
decision variables are continuous and they are endowed with
coherent risk measures, i.e., convex risk measures where posi-
tive homogeneity also holds. Consequently, their payoff func-
tions are concave with respect to maximization. Similarly, the
third statement holds for the ISO and market-clearing agents,
as they solve wait-and-see optimization problems by choosing
continuous decision variables from convex strategy sets.
Remark 8. Existence does not imply uniqueness.
Theorem 7 shows that, with a price cap of VOLL, there exists
a set of prices which clear the market when the participants are
risk-averse. However, Theorem 7 does not imply that this set of
prices is unique. Indeed, [8] provides examples of risk-averse
energy-only pool markets which admit multiple equilibria.
We now consider RAP(i)’s first-order optimality condition,
with a view to obtaining insight into the relationship between
x⋆ and X⋆(ω). To do so, we assume that Ω represents the
true distribution of uncertainty. Consequently, the below results
hold for the true distribution of uncertainty, while solutions to
RAEQ constitute SAA estimators of the solution for the true
distribution. However, SAA estimators for variational inequal-
ities converge exponentially fast as we increase the sample size
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[see 20]. Therefore, the below results hold for RAEQ, in the
limit of large samples.
We also need to clarify our understanding of the remunera-
tion process. To see this, consider the auctioneer’s price-setting
problem MC(ω) in scenario ω, and assume that the optimal
choice of dual price is VOLL > λ⋆n (ω) > 0 for some node n.
Then, the corresponding DC-load-flow constraint must be met
exactly, because otherwise the unique optimal choice of nodal
price is VOLL. Therefore, we have that any λn(ω) ∈ [0,VOLL]
is an optimal choice of dual price at this node, with all such
choices providing the auctioneer with a payoff of 0. That is,
the remuneration scheme suggested by RAEQ provides highly
degenerate dual prices. Consequently, we assume that partic-
ipants are dispatched and remunerated in the same manner as
SLP, although they may be risk-averse when making their pre-
commitment decision. In this context, each generation agent
i solves a risk-averse newsvendor problem to determine their
pre-commitment behaviour.
This observation allows us to characterize the impact of a
generator’s risk-aversion on their pre-commitment behaviour in
the following proposition:
Proposition 9. Let generator i be risk-averse and endowed
with the coherent risk measure ρ : Z 7→ R, which has the
following Kusuoka representation:
ρ[Z] = −E[Z] + κ sup
µ∈D
∫ β=1
β=0
1
β
qβ[Z]µdβ.
Then, for a given set of second stage dispatches X⋆
i
(ω), gener-
ator i makes the pre-commitment decision x⋆
i
, where:
x⋆i = F
−1
X⋆
i
(ω)
( ru,i
(ru,i + rv,i)(1 + κ(1 − β¯))
)
,
β¯ =
∫ 1
0
µRNβdβ; κ ∈ [0,
1
β¯
],
and F−1(·) denotes the pseudoinverse CDF of the probability
distribution of X⋆
i
(ω).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Proposition 9 indicates that increasing generator
i’s risk coefficient κ(1 − β¯) from its risk-neutral level
κ(1 − β¯) = 1(1 − 1) = 0 results in generator i decreasing
their pre-commitment setpoint from its risk-neutral level.
We formalize this observation in the following corollary to
Proposition 9.
Corollary 10. Let generator i be endowed with the coherent
risk measure ρi. Then, for a given set of second stage dis-
patches X⋆
i
(ω), generator i makes the pre-commitment decision
x⋆
i
(X⋆
i
(ω)), which is such that:
x⋆i (X
⋆
i (ω)) ≤ x
⋆
i,RN(X
⋆
i (ω)),
where x⋆
i,RN
(X⋆
i
(ω)) is generator i’s risk-neutral pre-
commitment decision for the second-stage dispatches X⋆
i
(ω).
Proof. The proof follows from a simple application of Proposi-
tion 9.
Remark 11. We note that Corollary 10 assumes a given set of
X⋆
i
(ω), while that these real time dispatches may change with a
change in risk aversion. This leaves open the possibility that the
equilibrium pre-commitment then may not have decreased from
the starting pre-commitment. However, we draw the reader’s
attention to a symmetric duopoly, where demand should be
met by two symmetric generators. In this case, the result is
a clear decrease in pre-commitment, even in the equilibrium of
the game when both firms change their risk aversion level.
The analysis in the previous sections indicates that modify-
ing the total pre-commitment magnitude impacts the payoffs
to the market participants. Consequently, a pertinent question
is “what is the impact of generator risk-aversion on the gen-
erator’s expected payoff?”. We provide a lower bound on this
quantity in the following proposition:
Proposition 12. Let generator i’s risk-aversion be represented
by the risk measure ρi, which has a Kusuoka representation
such that β¯i :=
∫ 1
0
µRNβidβi, κi ∈ [0,
1
β¯i
], and combine these
quantities by defining αi :=
1
1+κi(1−β¯i)
. Then generator i’s ex-
pected profit is at least (1 − αi)ru,ix
⋆
i
.
Proof. Proposition 9 shows that the quantity αi :=
1
κi−κiβ¯i
sum-
marizes the relationship between generator i’s pre-commitment
and its production, since x⋆
i
is a
αiru,i
ru,i+rv,i
quantile of the distribu-
tion of X⋆
i
(ω). Therefore, X⋆
i
(ω) ≤ x⋆
i
with probability
αiru,i
ru,i+rv,i
.
Moreover, it follows from [21, Corollary 1] that generator i re-
ceives a payoff of at least −rv,ix
⋆
i
with probability
αiru,i
ru,i+rv,i
, and
at least ru,ix
⋆
i
with probability
(1−αi)ru,i+rv,i
ru,i+rv,i
. Computing the ex-
pected payoff then yields the result.
Proposition 12 suggests that generator risk-aversion results
in a lower pre-commitment magnitude than the optimal risk-
neutral setpoint, which reduces cumulative system welfare.
Moreover, Proposition 12 indicates that marginal generators
may have an incentive to behave in a risk-averse manner, as
the expected profit of risk-neutral marginal generators who are
never dispatched at their output capacity is 0 (this follows from
Proposition 1), and the expected profit of risk-averse marginal
generators is bounded from below by a strictly positive quantity.
To see that this situation can also arise in SDM, observe that
generators can express their risk-aversion by inflating the rel-
ative magnitude of rv,i, their marginal cost of deviating down-
ward, in order that the auctioneer dispatches them at a lower
pre-commitment setpoint. Indeed, a recent numerical study [9]
confirms our finding, by demonstrating that in a two-market
stochastic equilibrium where generators are endowed with the
CVaR risk criterion, generators prefer to pre-commit less gen-
eration when they are more risk-averse
Fortunately, Ralph and Smeers [15] provide a framework for
extending SDM to cope with risk-aversion: introducing an aux-
iliary financial market wherein generators and the ISO can trade
risk. If generators and the ISO are endowed with intersecting
risk sets, then trading Arrow-Debreu securities causes each par-
ticipant’s effective risk-aversion to decrease to the least risk-
averse participant’s risk-aversion, leaving only residual risk. In
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this case, each generator’s pre-commitment decision is equiva-
lent to the decision made by a risk-averse system optimizer who
uses the least risk averse agent’s risk set as its own.
3.2. Risk-averse SDM With Risk Trading
In this section, we extend our preceding analysis to consider a
stochastic energy-only market where participants trade Arrow-
Debreu securities on an exchange. We begin by defining the
market clearing problem.
We require the following definition:
Definition 13. An Arrow-Debreu security is a contract which
charges the price π(ω) to receive a payoff of 1 in scenario ω.
We let Wi(ω) denote the bundle of Arrow-Debreu securities held
by agent i [see 15].
We also require the following notation:
• θi is generator i’s risk-adjusted payoff.
• θk is the ISO’s risk-adjusted payoff.
• Wk(ω) is the quantity of Arrow-Debreu securities pur-
chased by the ISO in scenario ω.
• Pim(ω) is the probability measure corresponding to themth
extreme point of generator i’s risk set.
• Pkm(ω) is the probabilitymeasure corresponding to themth
extreme point of the ISO’s risk set.
Assume that each generator submits the same offers as in
SDM, that all generators and the ISO submit their risk sets
before the market is cleared, and that the intersection of the
participants’ risk sets is non-empty. Then, clearing the market
is equivalent to minimizing cumulative risk-adjusted disutility
[15], i.e., solving the following risk-averse stochastic program:
RASLP: min
∑
i
θi + θk
s.t. θi ≥
∑
ω
Pim(ω)
(
ciXi(ω) + ru,iUi(ω)
+ rv,iVi(ω) −Wi(ω)
)
,∀i,∀m,
θk +
∑
ω
Pkm(ω)Wk(ω) ≥ 0,∀m,
∑
i∈T (n)
Xi(ω) + τn(F(ω)) ≥ Dn(ω),∀ω ∈ Ω,
∑
i
Wi(ω) +Wk(ω) = 0,∀ω ∈ Ω, [π(ω)],
x + U(ω) − V(ω) = X(ω),∀ω ∈ Ω,
F(ω) ∈ F , ∀ω ∈ Ω,
0 ≤ X(ω) ≤ G(ω), U(ω),V(ω), x ≥ 0, ∀ω ∈ Ω,
where we enumerate the extreme points of each generator’s risk
set in order to express the market-clearing problem as a single
linear program. Note that RASLP may not be a linear program
of finite size, as participants may reflect their risk-aversion via
non-polyhedral risk sets. Nonetheless, RASLP can be solved in
a tractable fashion, by (1) observing that it corresponds to max-
imizing risk-adjusted social welfare under the least risk-averse
participants risk measure, and (2) solving this risk-averse mar-
ket clearing problem using either (a) an interior point method
if the least risk-averse participant has a polyhedral risk mea-
sure or (b) the Bundle Method [see 11] if the least risk-averse
participant has a non-polyhedral risk measure.
After solving RASLP, participants are remunerated for their
dispatch in the same manner as SDM, and participants are re-
munerated with the term Wi(ωˆ) −
∑
ω π(ω)Wi(ω) in scenario ωˆ
for their financial instruments, as per [15].
As noted by [15], the dual prices of the Arrow-Debreu secu-
rities, π(ω), correspond to the system optimizer’s risk-adjusted
probability measure. The equivalence between dual prices and
the worst-case probability measure allows us to rewrite the sys-
tem optimization objective function as:
min
x,u,v
ρ(c⊤X(ω) + r⊤u U(ω) + r
⊤
v V(ω)),
where ρ is a coherent risk measure with risk set D. If
D = {P(ω)} then (1) there exists a risk-neutral agent which ab-
sorbs all risk in the market, (2) the Arrow-Debreu securities are
priced at P(ω), and (3) there is no residual system risk [see 15].
Interestingly, unlike the risk-averse competitive equilibrium
studied in the previous section, it is straightforward to elicit ver-
ifiable conditions for existence and uniqueness of a risk-averse
competitive equilibrium in the presence of risk trading. Exis-
tence can be verified by solving the system optimization prob-
lem. Moreover, if F is a polyhedral set, uniqueness can be
verified by following [2, Exercise 3.9].
Our main interest in this paper is determining the impact of
the existence of financial instruments on the pre-commitment
setpoint. Consequently, we change our perspective and assume
that Ω represents the true distribution of uncertainty. Strictly
speaking, the optimal solution to RASLP constitutes an SAA
estimator of the optimal solution for the true distribution. How-
ever, SAA estimators are known to converge almost surely to
the optimal solution for the underlying distribution [see 18].
Therefore, the below results hold almost surely true for solu-
tions to RASLP, wherever the sample of the underlying distri-
bution is sufficiently rich.
We now study the system optimization’s first-order optimal-
ity condition with respect to each generator i. As we are con-
sidering a system optimization problem rather than an individ-
ual generator’s problem, our objective is risk-adjusted expected
fuel cost minimization rather than risk-adjusted expected profit
maximization, and we are risk-averse to scenarios with high
fuel plus deviation costs rather than scenarios with low nodal
prices. This observation leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 14. Suppose that the system is risk-averse and en-
dowed with the law invariant coherent risk measure ρ : Z 7→ R,
which has the Kusuoka representation:
ρ[Z] = −E[Z] + κ sup
µ∈D
∫ β=1
β=0
1
β
qβ[Z]µdβ.
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Then, for a given dispatch policy X⋆(ω), each generator makes
the pre-commitment decision to produce x⋆
i
, where:
x⋆i = F
−1
X⋆
i
(ω)
( ru,i + (ru,i + rv,i)(κ − κβ¯)
(ru,i + rv,i)(1 + κ(1 − β¯))
)
,
β¯ =
∫ 1
0
µRNβdβ, κ ∈ [0,
1
β¯
],
and F−1(·) denotes the pseudoinverse CDF of the probability
distribution of X⋆
i
(ω).
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
We remind the reader that the dispatch policy X⋆(ω) obtained
from RASLP and used in Proposition 14 is not necessarily the
same dispatch policy as that obtained from RAEQ and used in
Proposition 9. In particular, both dispatch policies are functions
of (1) the problem data and (2) their (respective and possibly
different) pre-commitment setpoints.
Proposition 14 has the following interpretation: although
the real-time price λ(ω) is a maximally monotone operator
with respect to realised demand, meaning risk-averse genera-
tors place additional emphasis on high-wind scenarios and re-
duce their pre-commitment from a risk-neutral setpoint, Arrow-
Debreu securities re-align generators incentives, causing them
to view high-wind scenarios favourably, and increase their pre-
commitment magnitude from its risk-neutral setpoint. We for-
malize this observation in the following corollary:
Corollary 15. Let the system be endowed with the coherent
risk measure ρ. Then, for a given second stage dispatch pol-
icy X⋆(ω), each generator makes the pre-commitment decision
x⋆
i
(X⋆
i
(ω)), which is bounded from below by the following ex-
pression:
x⋆i (X
⋆
i (ω)) ≥ x
⋆
i,RN(X
⋆
i (ω)),
where x⋆
i,RN
(X⋆
i
(ω)) is generator i’s risk-neutral pre-
commitment decision.
We remind the reader that the second-stage dispatches from
SLP and RASLP are distinct, meaning we cannot make a direct
comparison between x⋆
i
and x⋆
i,RN
. However, recalling that the
optimal real-time dispatch is continuous in the pre-commitment
decision x, Corollary 15 applies when the least risk-averse par-
ticipant’s behaviour is sufficiently close to risk-neutrality that
the second-stage dispatches under SLP and RASLP are identi-
cal. Consequently, the above corollaries can be thought of as
risk-averse sensitivity analysis results.
The analysis in the previous sections suggests that increasing
the total amount of pre-commitment decreases expected nodal
prices. Consequently, a pertinent question is “does an auxiliary
risk market remove the positive relationship between a genera-
tor’s risk-aversion and its expected payoff?”.
Proposition 16. Let the system be risk-averse with risk mea-
sure ρ, which has a Kusuoka representation such that β¯ :=∫ 1
0
µRNβdβ, κ ∈ [0, 1
β¯
], and combine these two quantities by
defining α := 1
1+κ(1−β¯)
. Then, generator i’s expected profit is
at least −(1 − α)rv,ix
⋆
i
.
Proof. Proposition 14 shows that the quantity αi :=
1
κi−κi β¯i
summarizes the relationship between generation agent i’s pre-
commitment and its production, since x⋆
i
is a
ru,i+(1−αi)ru,i
ru,i+rv,i
quan-
tile of the distribution of X⋆
i
(ω). Therefore, Xi(ω)
⋆ ≤ x⋆
i
with
probability
ru,i+(1−αi)ru,i
ru,i+rv,i
. Moreover, it follows from [21, Corol-
lary 1] that each generation agent i receives a payoff of at least
−rv,ix
⋆
i
with probability
ru,i+(1−α)rv,i
ru,i+rv,i
and receives a payoff of at
least ru,ix
⋆
i
with probability
αrv,i
ru,i+rv,i
. Computing the expected
payoff then yields the result.
The above analysis might appear to suggest that expected
cost-recovery is not guaranteed in RASLP. However, the above
analysis does not include payoffs from the auxiliary risk mar-
ket. Indeed, by comparison with the feasible choice of non-
participation in both markets, which has a certain payoff of 0
under any coherent risk measure, it is not too hard to see that
risk-averse generators must recover their risk-adjusted costs in
expectation. However, profits from the auxiliary risk market are
derived by assuming risk, unlike Proposition 12.
4. Conclusion
This paper examines the stochastic dispatch problem from
the perspective of risk averse participants, and presents a char-
acterization of the impact of pre-commitment on real-time
nodal prices, and its interplay with contracts. Furthermore,
it provides a characterization of the impact of risk-aversion
on pre-commitment, which allows risk-averse equilibria to be
elicited according to the optimal solution of a linear program,
even with non-polyhedral risk sets. We have demonstrated that
risk aversion can be a reason to deviate from a system optimal
pre-commitment level, but that a complete risk market would
eliminate any incentive to deviate from the system optimal pre-
commitment.
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Appendix A Omitted Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 9
To show this result, we model an arbitrary generator as a
risk-averse newsvendor by using the notation in [6], and we
convert to the notation used in the main body of this paper ex-
post. This choice maintains consistency with the newsvendor
literature, because conventional newsvendormodels assume the
cost of stocking a product is incurred in the first stage, whilst
we assume that the cost of stocking a product is incurred in
the second stage, and modify our deviation costs accordingly.
Our approach can be viewed as a generalization of that taken in
Section 5 of [6], as we include the possibility that newsvendors
might back-order in the second stage and incur an additional
cost for doing so (i.e. ramp up their plant’s production at a
marginal cost of ci + ru,i), while the analysis conducted by Choi
et al. [6] precludes the possibility that X⋆
i
(ω) > x⋆
i
.
We require the following terms:
• e is the marginal emergency order cost.
• s is the marginal salvage value.
• p is the marginal sale price.
• c is the marginal ordering cost.
• x is the initial order quantity.
• D is the stochastic demand.
• y+ = max(y, 0) is the positive component of y.
• Π(x,D) is the newsvendor’s profit with initial stock x and
demand D.
• ρ is a law-invariant coherent risk measure.
We define the newsvendor’s profit function as:
Π(x,D) = pD − cx + s(x − D)+ − e(D − x)+,
= (p − e)D + (e − c)x − (e − s)(x − D)+,
= (e − c)x + Z+,
where Z+ := (p − e)D − (e − s)(x − D)+.
We now invoke Kusuoka’s Theorem [see 10] to represent the
law-invariant coherent risk measure ρ via the following expres-
sion:
ρ[Z] = −E[Z] + κ sup
µ∈D
∫ β=1
β=0
1
β
qβ[Z]µdβ,
where qβ[Z] = minη∈R E[max((1 − β)(η − Z), β(Z − η))] =
β(CVaRβ[Z] + E[Z]).
The above expression permits a representation of the
newsvendor’s risk-adjusted profit via the following function:
ρ(Π(x,D)) = −E[Π(x,D)] + κ sup
µ∈D
∫ β=1
β=0
1
β
qβ[Π(x,D)]µdβ,
= −(e − c)x − E[Z+] + κ sup
µ∈D
∫ β=1
β=0
1
β
qβ[Z+]µdβ,
as (e − c)x is invariant and qβ[Z + a] = qβ[Z] for nonrandom a.
Moving E[Z+] within the integral and using the substitution
qβ[Z] = β(CVaRβ[Z] + E[Z]), provides the following expres-
sion:
ρ(Π(x,D)) = −(e − c)x + sup
µ∈D
∫ β=1
β=0
(
E[Z+](κβ − 1)
+κβCVaRβ[Z+]
)
µdβ.
Observe that the β quantile of Z+ must be lower than in the
risk-neutral case. In the risk-neutral case, the optimal choice of
x is the c−s
e−s
quantile of D (this result is well-known, see [18]),
which corresponds to equality between the βth quantile of Z+
and (p − s)D. In the risk-averse case, the βth quantile of Z+
is (equal or) lower and is therefore equal to (p − s)D − (e − s)x
for some x and some D. This observation allows us to define
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the partial derivatives of the expectation and CVaR terms within
ρ(Π(x,D) as follows:
∂E[Z+]
∂x
= −(e − s)P(x > D),
∂CVaRβ[Z+]
∂x
= −
∂
∂x
{
(p − s)D − (e − s)x
−
1
β
E[(p − s)D − (e − s)x − Z+]
}
,
= (e − s) −
1
β
(e − s) +
1
β
(e − s)P(x > D),
= (e − s)(1 −
1
β
) + P(x > D)(e − s)
1
β
.
Now, assume that the supremum over the risk set D is uniquely
attained at the measure µˆ; then we have the following first-order
optimality condition:
∂ρ(Π(x,D))
∂x
= −(e − c)
+
∫ β=1
β=0
(
(e − s)(1 + κ − κβ)P(x > D)
− κ(e − s)(1 − β)
)
µˆdβ,
= −(e − c) + P(x > D)(e − s)
(
1 + κ − κ
( ∫ β=1
β=0
βµˆdβ
))
− κ(e − s)(1 − (
∫ β=1
β=0
βµˆdβ)).
Setting this condition to 0 and re-arranging for P(x > D) yields:
P(x > D) =
(e − c) + κ(e − s)(1 − β¯)
(e − s)(1 + κ − κβ¯)
,
where β¯ =
∫ 1
0
µRNβdβ is the expected value of the risk-averse
probabilities with respect to the risk-neutral probabilities.
Netting against 1 to find P(x ≤ D) then yields:
P(x ≤ D) =
(c − s)
(e − s)(1 + κ − κβ¯)
.
To convert to our notation, observe that ru = c − s and
rv = e − c, giving
ru + rv = e − s. Therefore, we have that:
P(x ≤ D) =
ru
(ru + rv)(1 + κ − κβ¯)
,
as required. Note that the corresponding quantile is not neces-
sarily unique because x⋆ is attained by solving a linear program
(which does not have a unique solution, in general), and if there
are multiple optimal choices of x⋆ then multiple X⋆(ω)’s may
correspond to optimal choices of x⋆.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 14
To show this result, we invoke the observation made by [21]
that for a given set of second-stage dispatches X⋆(ω), the sys-
tem solves a newsvendor problem in order to determine the pre-
commitment setpoint which minimizes the term
E[ru,iUi(ω) + rv,iVi(ω)]
for each generator i. Consequently, we use the same notation
as in the proof of Proposition 9. We require p = 0, as we
are considering a system optimization problem and any revenue
accrued by a generator is provided by the ISO. Therefore, the
system’s residual cost with respect to a particular generator’s
pre-commitment decision, Π(x,D), is defined by the following
expression:
Π(x,D) = −cx + s(x − D)+ − e(D − x)+,
= −eD + (e − c)x − (e − s)(x − D)+,
= (e − c)x + Z+.
By following the steps outlined in Appendix A.1, we obtain the
following risk-adjusted profit function:
ρ(Π(x,D)) = −(e − c)x − E[Z+] + κ sup
µ∈D
∫ β=1
β=0
1
β
qβ[Z+]µdβ.
Now observe that since p = 0, the risk-neutral critical fractile
becomes −eD. Since s(x − D) − ex gives a lower system cost
than −eD we therefore have that the critical fractile within each
CVaR term becomes equal to −eD. This situation is similar
to Section 5.3 of [6], although we include emergency holding
costs. Consequently, the partial derivatives of the terms which
constitute ρ become:
∂E[Z+]
∂x
= −(e − s)P(x > D),
∂CVaRβ[Z+]
∂x
= −
∂
∂x
{
− eD −
1
β
E[−eD − Z+]
}
=
1
β
(e − s)P(x > D).
Now assume that µ = µˆ is the unique optimal pdf. Then, we
have the following first-order condition:
∂ρ(Π(x,D))
∂x
= −(e − c) +
∫ β=1
β=0
(
(e − s)(1 + κ − κβ)P(x > D)
)
µˆdβ,
= −(e − c) + P(x > D)(e − s)
(
1 + κ − κ
∫ β=1
β=0
βµˆdβ
)
.
Setting this condition to 0 and re-arranging for P(x > D) yields:
P(x > D) =
(e − c)
(e − s)(1 + κ − κβ¯)
,
where β¯ =
∫ 1
0
µRNβdβ is the expected value of the risk-averse
probabilities with respect to the risk-neutral probabilities.
Netting against 1 to find P(x ≤ D) then yields:
P(x ≤ D) =
(c − s) + (e − s)(κ − κβ¯)
(e − s)(1 + κ − κβ¯)
.
To convert to our notation, observe that ru = c − s and
rv = e − c, giving
ru + rv = e − s. Therefore, we have that:
P(x ≤ D) =
ru + (ru + rv)(κ − κβ¯)
(ru + rv)(1 + κ − κβ¯)
,
as required. Note that the corresponding quantile is not neces-
sarily unique.
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